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ARTICLE OPEN
Sharing health-related data: a privacy test?
Stephanie OM Dyke1, Edward S Dove2 and Bartha M Knoppers1
Greater sharing of potentially sensitive data raises important ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI), which risk hindering and even
preventing useful data sharing if not properly addressed. One such important issue is respecting the privacy-related interests of
individuals whose data are used in genomic research and clinical care. As part of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health
(GA4GH), we examined the ELSI status of health-related data that are typically considered ‘sensitive’ in international policy and data
protection laws. We propose that ‘tiered protection’ of such data could be implemented in contexts such as that of the GA4GH
Beacon Project to facilitate responsible data sharing. To this end, we discuss a Data Sharing Privacy Test developed to distinguish
degrees of sensitivity within categories of data recognised as ‘sensitive’. Based on this, we propose guidance for determining the
level of protection when sharing genomic and health-related data for the Beacon Project and in other international data sharing
initiatives.
npj Genomic Medicine (2016) 1, 16024; doi:10.1038/npjgenmed.2016.24; published online 17 August 2016
INTRODUCTION
The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (Global Alliance1) is
an international coalition dedicated to improving human health
by maximising the potential of genomic medicine through data
sharing. Central to this endeavour is its Framework for Responsible
Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data.2 While the broad
benefits of such sharing are largely uncontested, greater access to
potentially sensitive data raises important ethical, legal and social
issues (ELSI).3,4 If not properly addressed, these issues risk
hindering and even preventing useful data sharing that can
improve human health. One such important issue is respecting the
privacy-related interests of individuals whose data are used in
genomic research and clinical care.5
In all kinds of data sharing—publishing it freely on the world
wide web or sharing it only with approved users or under strict
controls—the question of which data present higher privacy risk,
and therefore warrant higher protection, arises. We have aimed to
determine which types of genomic and health data would require
either a lower or higher level of protection in an ethically and
legally coherent manner, and to enable this classification,
developed a Data Sharing Privacy Test. We drew on the legal
term ‘sensitive data’ in data protection and privacy regulation
around the world to identify all health-related data categories that
may occur in practice and would likely require higher protection,
at least for some types of information in these categories (e.g.,
personal data concerning sexually-transmitted disease). As the
recently agreed EU General Data Protection Regulation notes:
‘Personal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in
relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, deserve specific
protection as the context of their processing may create important
risks for the fundamental rights and freedoms’.6 At the same
time, however, the Regulation acknowledges that an absolute
prohibition on processing (including sharing) sensitive categories
of data is not realistic. Processing should be allowed when subject
to suitable safeguards so as to protect fundamental rights.
This permission is particularly noted where grounds of public
interest justify, including for the prevention or control of
communicable diseases and other serious threats to health, and
scientific research purposes.
The purpose of the proposed Data Sharing Privacy Test is to
determine which types of information in these sensitive data
categories would fall within or outside a zone of heightened
protection. In proposing a novel method to implement ‘tiered
protection’ of data, this approach may simultaneously allow us to
determine which information will only entail de minimis risk in
certain contexts such as the Beacon Project, which we used as a
test case, and so be largely exempt from additional protection.
The Beacon Project is a key Global Alliance Demonstration Project
that was launched as a test of the willingness of international
research and clinical sites to share genomic data in the simplest of
all technical contexts (ga4gh.org/#/beacon). Its goal is to address
barriers to international genomic data sharing by fostering the
creation and development of ‘Beacons’ that share data in a
manner that respects the interests of research participants,
including their privacy. A Beacon is a simple public web service
that any institution can implement, designed to accept simple
queries such as ‘Do you have record of any genomes with an 'A' at
position 100,735 on chromosome 3'. If Beacon databases are large
enough that inclusion in them does not in itself reveal anything
‘sensitive’, and responses to Beacon queries do not provide
individually identifying information and are considered with
respect to data sensitivity, privacy is not an issue.
We believe the Data Sharing Privacy Test to be widely
applicable to genomic research and clinical data sets of use in
both research and clinical care. We also provide additional
guidance in the form of points-to-consider to facilitate consistent
assessment of privacy risk.
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RESULTS
Categories of sensitive data
How we categorize and classify sensitive data (i.e., what factors
influence judgments about the degree of sensitivity) is an ongoing
critical challenge, as what makes something (and who determines)
‘sensitive’ is highly context-dependent. Sensitive data, or ‘sensitive
information’ as may be synonymously termed in law, is a vague
concept of varying interpretation in data privacy legislation,
administrative treatment and case law around the world. In data
privacy law, sensitive data receive heightened levels of data
protection beyond the baseline protections otherwise required.
Typically, individuals and organisations may only collect, store,
or otherwise process sensitive data for specific purposes and
under special conditions, such as the explicit consent of the data
subject (though this latter condition is sometimes subject to
certain exceptions, such as scientific research purposes with
proper governance oversight). Furthermore, for our purposes,
defining categories of health-related data requiring an assessment
of data sensitivity in the context of genomic data sharing for
research and clinical care entailed going beyond analysis of the
defined (and rigid) sensitive data categories in data privacy
legislation so as to identify other forms of personal data that may
be present in relevant data sets and receive heightened data
privacy protection under the law. For example, telecommunication
providers are often required to give heightened data protection to
customers’ geolocation data associated with their mobile phones,
as these data can reveal precise information about the physical
location of users. These protections typically include obtaining the
customer’s explicit consent before disclosing this information to
other businesses for marketing purposes. Second, as most of the
data privacy legislation we reviewed is designed to apply much
more broadly than to data in the healthcare or research sector,
selecting potential categories of sensitive data involved assessing
how general categories of sensitive data (e.g., a person’s religious
views) might intersect with genomic and associated health data
used in research and clinical care.
We propose that several categories of health-related data
warrant careful consideration for the purposes of implementing
responsible data sharing practices (Table 1). While there may be
some overlap between the categories of sensitive data, they
provide useful thematic groups and provide the additional
advantage that, where applicable, they can allow for compatibility
with existing regulation. These categories are either likely to (e.g.,
genetic, ethnicity, mental health, children and minors), or could
conceivably (e.g., addictions and substance abuse, sexually-
transmitted disease, disability, reproductive care, palliative care,
geolocation), be present when sharing data sets for health-related
genomic research.
A Data Sharing Privacy Test
Having identified data categories which may contain information
requiring a heightened level of protection in the context of health-
related data, it was clear that for some of the areas considered
some information within the categories would be more sensitive,
e.g., ethnicity information about small or vulnerable population
groups. We therefore developed a method for assessing different
types of health-related data falling within these categories using a
Data Sharing Privacy Test. We drew on the type of data privacy
assessment the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat proposed be
conducted prior to contracting personal information.7 This is an
‘invasion-of-privacy’ test, which provides guidance in determining
whether a contract would result in harm or injury to an individual
by considering three main factors: the sensitivity of the informa-
tion, the expectations of the individual, and the probability and
gravity of injury.
In addition to variation in sensitivity within defined categories
of sensitive data such as data concerning ethnicity, what
constitutes sensitive data may be understood better from the
perspective of their (mis)use, i.e., the privacy harms that could
manifest, and to what magnitude, if these data were misappro-
priated or misused. This risk-based approach better aligns with the
rationale of classifying data as sensitive. As the European Union’s
expert committee on data protection issues (Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party) explained: ‘The rationale behind
regulating particular categories of data in a different way stems
from the presumption that misuse of these data could have more
severe consequences on the individual’s fundamental rights, such
as the right to privacy and non-discrimination, than misuse of
other, ‘normal’ personal data'.8 Thus, it could be said that sensitive
data are data whose improper use, including unwarranted
disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause serious physical
or moral harm, significant financial loss or excessive personal distress
to the data subject and/or related others. These data include not
only data which by their nature may reasonably be said to contain
sensitive information, but also data from which sensitive informa-
tion with regard to an individual or group can reasonably be
abstracted or concluded. We therefore specifically consider the
potential resulting harm that may result as a consequence of data
re-identification as the second point of our Data Sharing
Privacy Test.
The final point we propose considering with the Data Sharing
Privacy Test is the expectations of the individuals concerned with
respect to the sharing of these data. The information that has
been provided to research participants and patients during the
consent process may inform this assessment, as well as social
studies of public perceptions of relevant risks and benefits. We
note that where data sharing has been agreed to, there is an
expectation that researchers will honour this consent.
The Data Sharing Privacy Test (Figure 1) is therefore a privacy
impact assessment based on:
1. The data’s sensitivity (noting variation of definition and of
protection within predefined categories of sensitive data in
data privacy regulation);
2. The potential resulting harm from possible re-identification of
the data; and
3. Individuals’ expectations with respect to the data being shared.
All three points will depend to some extent on context, e.g., the
jurisdiction of patients and research participants and applicable
laws and socio-cultural values, as well as the views of individuals
and communities. The first two points should nonetheless usually
lead to similar classification of data from different individuals in
Table 1. List of categories of sensitive data identified in regulatory
and policy data privacy instruments, and in consultation with the
scientific community (see also Supplementary Table S1)
Categories of sensitive data
Ethnicity
Genetic
Mental health
Addictions, substance abuse
Sexually-transmitted disease
Children, minors
Disability
Reproductive care
Palliative care
Sex life
Behavioural profiles
Domestic violence
Geolocation
Finances
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the same environment, whereas the third point will often depend
on individual preferences.
Degrees of data sensitivity
We propose that some or all of the data in each sensitive data
category (Table 1) may require a heightened level of protection as
determined using our proposed Data Sharing Privacy Test.
Our approach of developing the categories based on legal
analysis was not an attempt or a proposal to redefine sensitive
data as a legal term, or to partition the term into ‘more sensitive’
and ‘less sensitive’ data. Rather, it was deemed a robust way for us
to ensure that we had considered appropriate categories for a
heightened degree of protection when providing access to data.
A similar approach was previously proposed for the treatment of
protected health information in medical records by the UK
National Health Service with the creation of a ‘sealed envelope’
component of electronic health records which required a higher
level of protection and could not be shared without patients’
explicit consent.9 While this approach for differential treatment of
medical record information raised different issues for patients
such as when emergency care teams should have access to certain
information and the stigma of having a sealed envelope,10
it flowed from the common-sense understanding that not all
health-related data are equally sensitive, and that the principle of
proportionality should be applied in situations that engender both
risk and potential benefit. As the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party of the European Union stated in a 2011 advice
paper ‘[C]ategories of data display major differences in the degree
of sensitivity. For example, health data may range from informa-
tion about a simple cold to stigmatizing information about
illnesses or disabilities. This leads to difficulties in practice, as the
individual’s consent is required even for unproblematic processing
of such data'.8 Data concerning health ranges from information
that would be very unlikely to cause any person harm to
stigmatizing information about present or future disease or
disability. Thus, protection levels can range from de minimus to
stringent, depending on sensitivity. Furthermore, the recently
agreed EU General Data Protection Regulation proposal includes
requirements for a data protection impact assessment to
determine levels of risk in data processing, some of which may
ultimately apply to genomic data sharing in scientific research and
clinical care:
‘The likelihood and severity of the risk for the rights and
freedoms of the data subject should be determined in function of
the nature, scope, context and purposes of the data processing.
Risk should be evaluated based on an objective assessment, by
which it is established whether data processing operations involve
a risk or a high risk.’6
For the purposes of the Beacon Project and similar data sharing
scenarios, health-related data should receive prima facie higher
protection if it falls in one of the data categories presented here
(Table 1), but only if on further analysis it falls in the zone of higher
protection within these categories. Of course, at all times,
processing of personal data must respect relevant laws.
Points-to-Consider
We developed further guidance for the types of health-related
information that on face value would require higher protection
within the categories of sensitive data identified in regulatory
approaches, which is based on their perceived potential to lead to
stigmatisation or discrimination, and on the vulnerability of data
subjects and their privacy interests. Specifically, we provide
‘Points-to-Consider’ for such sensitive data, recognising that
socio-economic and cultural factors are very important in their
interpretation and that the exercise of professional judgment in
particular contexts will play an important role. As per point 3 of
the Data Sharing Privacy Test, patient and research participant
consent will need to be considered along with this guidance,
which, although informed by social science research into public
views, including those of communities and other groups, does not
account for individual privacy preferences that are known to vary
considerably for the types of information we consider.11
Data falling in the following categories could include
health-related data on symptoms, diagnosis and treatment
(e.g., prescription medicines).
Ethnicity. Information about ethnicity or ethnic origin should
receive higher protection if it concerns small or vulnerable groups.
The determination of which groups are considered small or
vulnerable must be done locally as this is affected by social and
political context.12 Furthermore, analysis of this information in
research raises important questions about how it has been
recorded and the standardisation of terms describing groups.13
Using local publicly acceptable designations, such as those of
national census categories, may reduce the risks for individuals.
That research participants or patients belong to a particular
population group should be carefully determined, especially for
those groups that are considered small or vulnerable. The
voluntary disclosure of such information makes individuals aware
this information may be used for research or clinical care, and
therefore more likely to consider potential consequences of its use
for their communities. Group names should also be respectful of
communities’ views and good practice has been to consult
community members about how groups are described.14
Genetic. The category of genetic data could include biological
filiation (e.g., paternity) or forensic identification data but we limit
our discussion to information about clinical, genetic conditions.
In the context of the Beacon Project, this data category usually
refers to information about symptomatic genetic conditions that
will have been described, more or less precisely, for the purposes
of research studies or clinical care. As much diversity exists within
this category, we further propose a set of ‘Points-to-Consider’ that
expand on our proposed Data Sharing Privacy Test, especially its
first two points: (1) the sensitivity of the data, and (2) the potential
resulting harm from possible re-identification of an individual’s
data (Table 2).
First, if the genetic condition is outwardly visible, its sensitivity
theoretically would be considered very high, but visible conditions
are not private per se. Irrespective, the severity of the condition
informs the assessment of potential resulting harm from data
re-identification, which, in the absence of anti-discrimination
protections, is likely to be greater for more severe conditions.
Information about severe conditions should receive higher
protection. However, agreeing on degrees of severity for genetic
conditions is not without its challenges. Past research has
demonstrated considerable disagreement between experienced
genetics professionals as to what constitutes a ‘serious’ genetic
condition.15 Genetics professionals also expressed a strong
Figure 1. The three steps of a Data Sharing Privacy Test to
distinguish degrees of data sensitivity within categories of data
recognised as ‘sensitive’.
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aversion to such classification as genetic conditions vary in
expression and are perceived differently by individuals and in
different cultures, to say nothing of the varying social and
economic consequences this classification may have for patients.
The American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics has
nonetheless recently agreed on a list of genes in which
pathogenic variants should be reported to patients undergoing
clinical genome-scale sequencing if they wish to receive this
information.16,17 The list was based on the likelihood of severe
disease resulting from the variants and the possibility of its
prevention. In contexts in which carrier status is recorded,
assessments of severity should take variant penetrance and age
of disease onset into account.
It should also be considered whether the genetic condition is
associated with stigmatizing information such as information on
mental health or disability, or if it has consequences for
reproductive health. If associated with information that would
fall in the higher zone of protection of one of the other
categories of sensitive information identified here (Table 1), the
genetic condition could be considered potentially stigmatizing
information and receive higher protection.
For rare genetic conditions, two additional points should be
considered. Does it reveal the likely ancestry or geographical
location of individuals? If the rare disease is associated with a
certain ancestry, is this information about ethnicity that may be
considered potentially stigmatizing (see previous section)? If so,
or if the rare disease provides information about likely
geographical location of individuals, it should receive higher
protection.13 Paradoxically, more not less sharing is required to
elucidate the causes of rare diseases.18
Finally, the probability of carrier status for relatives should be
considered along with disease penetrance and age of onset.
Genetic conditions that are familial, highly penetrant, of early
onset and cause serious disease should receive higher protection.
If genetic conditions are not familial, the severity threshold for
providing more protection may be higher and reliance on
individual consent greater.
Mental health. All information pertaining to mental health
should receive higher protection. This category is defined as
information about any disturbance in an individual’s cognition,
emotion regulation or behaviour that may reflect a dysfunction in
the psychological, biological or developmental processes under-
lying mental functioning. This definition has been adapted to suit
this context from the American Psychiatric Association Fifth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5) definition of mental disorder19 with reference
to the World Health Organization International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th
Revision (ICD-10).20
Addictions, substance abuse. All information relating to substance
abuse and addictions should receive higher protection. It is
reasonable, however, to exempt information about low levels of
consumption of addictive substances, such as alcohol and
tobacco, reflecting their use rather than abuse, thereby requiring
a lower level of protection.
Sexually-transmitted disease. All information about sexually-
transmitted disease should receive higher protection.
Children, minors. Data concerning children and minors require
protection and special consideration by virtue of incapacity to
meaningfully exercise and express their autonomous interests,
and this beyond the general considerations of context that are
standard for information in other data categories.21 Although
studies show adolescents are more likely to withhold types of
information that are generally considered sensitive by the broader
population, such as sexual orientation, drug use, depression and
suicidal thoughts,22,23 their privacy interests may be greater than
those of adults. In a study by Cheng et al.,24 a quarter of
adolescents reported that they would not seek care for health
concerns if they thought their parents, friends or teachers might
find out. Second, predictive information such as for late-onset
conditions should receive higher protection. Finally, wherever
consent may be relied on to differentiate between levels of
protection for data within the other categories of sensitive
information, this should not be applied to data from children
and minors as they may not be able to express their consent
autonomously. It should be remembered, however, that like other
vulnerable populations, children and minors should not be
excluded from research on the sole basis of this ‘vulnerability’
as, e.g., there are paediatric conditions that are exclusive to this
group.25
Disability. All information concerning disability should receive
higher protection. The International Classification of Functioning,
Disability and Health (ICF) defines disability as ‘an umbrella term
for impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions.
Disability is the interaction between individuals with a health
condition (e.g., cerebral palsy, Down syndrome and depression)
and personal and environmental factors (e.g., negative attitudes,
inaccessible transportation and public buildings, and limited
social supports)'.26 Usually, disability legislation covers actual
discrimination based on visible disability and not discrimination
that is the result of being perceived as already disabled, as may
occur with predictive genetic data on a late-onset condition
where the individual is perceived as already having the condition
(see, however, the exemplary approach of the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
Reproductive care. All information concerning reproductive care,
including data about contraception and abortion, should receive
higher protection.
Palliative care. The World Health Organization defines
palliative care as ‘an approach that improves the quality of life
of patients and their families facing the problem associated with
life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of
suffering by means of early identification and impeccable
assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical,
Table 2. Genetic data: Points-to-Consider for assessing the degree of sensitivity of data on clinical, genetic conditions
Points-to-Consider
1 Is the genetic condition outwardly visible?
2 How severe is it? (serious disease, penetrance, age of onset)
3 Is it associated with what could be considered to be stigmatizing health information (e.g., associated with mental health, reproductive care,
disability)?
4 Is it familial (i.e., potential carrier status/reproductive implications for family/relatives)?
5 Does it provide information about the likely geographical location of individuals?
6 Does it provide information about ethnicity that may be considered potentially stigmatizing information?
Sharing health-related data
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psychosocial and spiritual'. Sensitive information requiring a
higher level of protection may arise in the context of end-of-life
care. Information concerning religious affiliation, especially, should
receive higher protection.
Geolocation. Information on geolocation within areas smaller
than a state, province or county (e.g., postal code, community
district) should receive higher protection. Geolocation combined
with environmental, health and socio-economic data can
adversely affect service provision and property values.27
Other categories of sensitive data. With the exception of data
concerning sex life, the following categories, while listed in some
laws, were not commonly found in the regulatory and policy
instruments we consulted. While we expect they may sometimes
be found in genomic health data sets, without further research on
their meaning, we cannot determine which types of data within
these categories may present in research and healthcare data sets,
nor whether they may require higher protection:
● Sex life
● Behavioural profiles
● Domestic violence
● Finances
DISCUSSION
A major challenge in applying our Data Sharing Privacy Test in the
health-related context is its dependence on context, and therefore
its reliance on contextual information, and on public perceptions
(the views and attitudes of individuals and communities). For
much of the contextual information, we rely on studies of law and
regulation, which while imperfect representations of situations
around the world, denote a common consensus within a given
nation, albeit somewhat static. Assessing changing public
perceptions is then perhaps the greatest challenge, yet much
better understanding and methods exist today than even a
decade ago. That we are intent on further determining the ELSI
status of these data, and believe our approach is feasible, rests on
two main facts. First, the policy and design of current data
sharing projects such as the Beacon Project allows sharing of
health-related data even if they are categorized as requiring
higher protection. This enables degrees of protection without
large negative consequences for data access and use. Second, we
believe the potential for application of guidance in the area of
research, as well as in healthcare, is vast and may be beneficial.
The Beacon Project
A recent study showed the theoretical confidence with which it
would be possible to use the Beacon API to determine the
presence or absence of an individual’s genetic data in a particular
Beacon database.28 Our novel concept of ‘tiered protection’ will be
piloted as a means to avoid the associated risk of inference of
phenotypic information that would not otherwise be available
from an individual’s genetic information, or of other health-related
information that may be provided through Beacons, whenever
such information falls within the zone of higher protection.
This will be achieved by aggregating Beacons holding data that
are linked to sensitive information requiring a higher level of
protection, thereby reducing the probability that any one
individual present in the data set is likely to have a particular
trait or condition. As the Beacon Project develops new applica-
tions, it is also envisaged our method will be used to determine
when user registration may be required to gain access to more
detailed data through Beacons (Registered Access (Dyke et al.)29).
As well as refining the boundaries of the zone of higher
protection, from which several tiers may emerge, our field-testing
with scientific studies involved in the Beacon Project and with
other Global Alliance projects may bring to light additional
categories and types of data that require consideration. It will also
allow us to gain a better understanding of the preponderance of
more and less sensitive health-related data.
We have proposed a systematic approach to categorizing
health-related data from genomic research and clinical data sets
as to the level of protection required in the context of the Beacon
Project and other projects foreseeing the sharing of health-related
data. In clarifying and defining data categories requiring
heightened protection, providing ‘Points-to-Consider’ for case-
by-case assessment, and identifying data categories that require
further consideration, we outline practical tiers of protection that
can be used to implement responsible data sharing. We now seek
to engage in broader community consultation, and to submit our
Data Sharing Privacy Test to international perspectives, with a
view to assessing the level of consensus on our approach. It is
important to stress again that context matters as evidenced by the
fact that generally the rare disease communities seek greater open
and accessible data sharing even while presumably heightened
protection would often apply to rare disease data. While we
believe this guidance will be useful to implement a range of
proportionate data governance and security mechanisms in other
settings, due consideration of the circumstances of data collec-
tions (e.g., of their collection, storage and access) and of potential
differences with the Beacon Project will be necessary as the tiers
of protection we propose for this project may not be suitable to
other situations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
To begin, we reviewed which categories of data were deemed sensitive in
data privacy regulation and policy guidelines in Europe and in the United
States.8,30–32 This led to the identification of 12 categories of information
that could reasonably pertain to health-related data and which accordingly
may warrant a heightened degree of protection. One other category was
added to this list (palliative care), which was not considered in the
regulatory and policy instruments we consulted, but was identified during
consultation on the proposed categories with the international scientific
community via the Global Alliance Data Working Group.33 Through
consultation of the international data privacy law literature, we then
conducted a more exhaustive review of the definitions of, or statements
on, sensitive personal data in the major data privacy laws in jurisdictions
around the world (covering 460 laws in 55 jurisdictions; see
Supplementary Table S1).34–41 This research led to the identification of
one additional category of sensitive data, namely data concerning
disability. That so much had been covered through the initial study of
EU Member States and US documents reflects the degree of international
harmonisation of standards aligned with these nations.
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